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Abstract
We investigate whether temporal preferences expressed as a sum of discounted
consumption utilities can be derived from a welfare representations in the form of a
sum of discounted total utilities. We ﬁnd that a consumption-based representation
in the usual exponential form corresponds to one-period “altruism” towards one’s
future selves: the current self gives positive weight to her total utility in the next pe-
riod, and weight zero to her total utility in all subsequent periods. We also ﬁnd that
a consumption-based representation in the quasi-exponential (β,δ)-form suggested
by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997) correspond to quasi-exponential
altruism towards one’s future selves. For β =1 /2, the welfare weights are exponen-
tial, while for β<1/2 they are biased in favor of the current self, and for β>1/2
in favor of one’s future selves. More generally, we establish a functional equation
which relates welfare weights to consumption-utility weights. We also postulate ﬁve
desiderata for consumption-utility weights. None of the usual formalizations satisfy
all desiderata, but we propose a simple formalization which does.
JEL codes: D11, D64, D91, E21.
Keywords: Altruism, discounting, dynamic inconsistency, time inconsistency,
welfare.
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11 Introduction
Time preferences have come into the foreground again in the economics literature, this time
in macroeconomics. This recent strand of the literature is focused on non-exponential or
“hyperbolic” preferences, which may lead to dynamic consistency problems, see for ex-
ample Laibson (1997), Barro (1999), Krusell and Smith (1999) and Harris and Laibson
(2001). This phenomenon was noted already by Ramsey (1928) and analyzed by Strotz
(1956), Pollak (1968), Phelps and Pollak (1968), and Peleg and Yaari (1973). In all these
studies, preferences are represented by utility functions in the form of a sum of discounted
instantaneous utilities from consumption. We here analyze the question whether such pref-
erences are consistent with the assumption of forward-looking agents who care about their
future total utility, not only about their future instantaneous utility from consumption.
In order to high-light the dynamic consistency issue, consider a decision-maker who is
to choose a sequence x =( x0,x 1,x 2,...) of consumption vectors xt to be consumed at dates
t =0 ,1,2,.... In Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997), the consumer’s preferences






where β>0 and 0 <δ<1. The term u(xt) is interpreted as the instantaneous utility









τ−1 preceding period τ. The reason is simple: once a future period
τ has become the present, the rate of substitution between the instantaneous utilities in
periods τ +1and τ has changed from its original value δ to the new value βδ. We will call
discount functions in the above (β,δ)-form quasi-exponential, with exponential discounting
as the special case β =1 .
In the cited studies, the function Uτ is decision theoretic in the usual sense of revealed
preferences: it determines the actual choice made by the consumer in period τ (with
due regard to the presence or absence of commitment possibilities). From a normative
viewpoint, Uτ (x) represents the welfare of the individual in period τ: the higher this
function value is, the “better oﬀ” is the individual in that period. Current welfare (or
“total utility”), so deﬁned, does not stem only from current consumption but also from
(the anticipation of) the stream of future consumption. But, by assumption, this is true
for the welfare in all future periods as well. In particular, the welfare in a future decision
period τ￿ >τwill in part depend on (anticipation in period τ￿ of) consumption in periods
t>τ ￿. However, formula (1) does not explicitly account for future welfare. For example,
a marginal increase in consumption two periods ahead from some decision period τ by
2an inﬁnitesimal amount ε>0 will add βδ
2εu￿ (xτ+2) to current welfare, but it will also
add βδεu￿ (xτ+2) to welfare in the next period - an eﬀect not explicitly accounted for in
equation (1).
We argue that a rational and forward-looking decision maker should respect the pref-
erences of his or her future selves. In particular, if also future selves are forward-looking,
then this should not be neglected by the current self.1 Alternatively phrased: a rational
decision maker who cares about his or her own welfare in future periods should strive to
maximize some increasing function of her welfare in those periods. By contrast, an individ-
ual who in each period strives to maximize Uτ, as deﬁned in equation (1), appears to suﬀer
from second-order myopia: she cares today about her future instantaneous utility from
consumption, but not about her future total utility (which also includes caring about her
future total utility etc.).2 Does this matter for the resulting behavior? Or are preferences
of the form (1) behaviorally equivalent with preferences that explicitly care about one’s
future welfare? We here investigate this question - whether consumption-based preferences
have a welfare-theoretic foundation in this sense.
In particular, we ﬁnd that a consumption-based representation (1) in the “classical”
exponential form, that is with β =1 , corresponds to one-period altruism towards one’s
future selves: the individual attaches weight δ to her welfare in the next period and
weight zero to all later periods (but her next self attaches weight δ to the welfare two
periods ahead, etc. in an inﬁnite chain). Such preferences are sometimes assumed in
intergenerational (dynastic) macroeconomic models, see for example Barro (1974) and
Barro and Becker (1988). We also ﬁnd that consumption-utility based representations
(1) in the quasi-exponential form, that is with β<1, correspond to quasi-exponential
altruism towards one’s future selves. The case β =1 /2 plays a special role. For such
quasi-exponential consumption-utility weights, the welfare weights are in fact exponential;
such individuals attach exponentially declining weight to their welfare in all future periods.
For β<1/2, the welfare weights are quasi-exponential with a bias in favor of the current
self (“myopia”), while for β>1/2 the welfare weights are biased in favor of one’s future
selves (“longsightedness”).
We also ﬁnd that exponential welfare weights attached to the next two periods - and
weight zero to all future periods - yield consumption-utility weights that are based on
the so-called Fibonacci sequence, and we show that these consumption weights need not
decrease monotonically over time. Indeed, such an individual may attach more weight to
his consumption two periods ahead than to the consumption next period. We also show,
by way of examples, that certain consumption-based preferences imply “spite” rather than
1This point was made already by Zeckhauser and Fels (1968), see below.
2A decision maker could be said to be ﬁrst-order myopic if she does not even care about her future
instantaneous utility from consumption, that is, if βδ =0in eq.(1).
3“altruism” towards one’s future selves, i.e., a preference for lower future welfare in certain
periods. For example, if the parameter β in equation (1) would instead apply to periods
t =2 ,3,..., rather than to periods t =1 ,2,..., then the associates welfare weight two
periods ahead would be negative (and this would be repeated each decision period).
We are not the ﬁrst to search for a welfare foundation of the consumption-based for-
mulation in equation (1). Already Zeckhauser and Fels (1968) raised the issue. They
showed that the welfare-based formulation behind the quasi-exponential consumption-
based representation (1) is also quasi-exponential. They also claimed that the boundary
case β = δ =1(“perfect altruism” as considered by Ramsey (1928)) has no welfare-
based counterpart.3 As indicated above, and shown below, this claim is not entirely
correct. There does exist a welfare representation, though not of the quasi-exponential
form, namely the above-mentioned one-period altruism which attaches welfare weight 1 to
the next period and zero to all other periods.
The present investigation may also have some bearing on a related modelling issue
in macroeconomics, namely whether it matters, in models of sequences of altruistic gen-
erations, if each generation cares about the next generation’s total utility, consumption
utility, consumption or wealth. Since the latter two cases are analytically considerably
simpler than the ﬁrst, and therefore more commonly used, our analysis might help iden-
tify circumstances under which the two latter models are behaviorally equivalent with the
ﬁrst model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the model
and establishes a one-to-one relationship between welfare weights and consumption-utility
weights. Section 3 analyzes a few examples from the literature, and section 4 postulates
some desiderata for discounting functions. None of the usual formulations satisfy all
desiderata, but in section 5 we propose a (three-dimensional) parametric family of discount
functions which meet the desiderata. Section 6 suggest how forward-looking discounting
models can be generalized to include memory of past consumption. Mathematical proofs
are collected in an appendix at the end of the paper.
2 The model
Consider an inﬁnitely lived individual who makes decisions over a sequence of periods
t ∈ N = {0,1,2,...}. In each period t, the individual consumes some vector xt ∈ X, where
X ⊂ Rn is a set of consumption alternatives and n ∈ N+ = {1,2,...}.A consumption
3“With δ =1 , equation (3) [our equation (1)] is meaningless.This rules out perfect altruism
[consumption-based altruism with δ =1 ] in a forward-looking model that relates altruistic preferences to
total utilities rather than felicities [instantaneous utilities].Here, total altruism [welfare-based altruism]
and perfect altruism are incompatible with each other.” (p. 4, Zeckhauser and Fels, 1968)
4stream x is an inﬁnite sequence of consumption vectors xt, and we write x =( x0,x 1,...) ∈
X∞. Let ￿τbe the preferences of the decision maker in period τ over consumption streams
x ∈ X∞.Apreference proﬁle ￿ for the individual is a sequence (￿τ)τ∈N of preferences,
one for each “self τ”.
We here study preference proﬁles that can be represented by stationary and additively
separable utility functions of the type used in the macroeconomics literature. More exactly,
we focus on preference proﬁles ￿￿τ￿τ∈N for which there exists functions Uτ : X∞ → R,o n e





for some for some u : X → R+ and f : N → R+ with f (0) = 1. Here u(xs) will be called
the instantaneous (sub)utility from consumption in period s,a n df(t) the weight that the
decision maker assigns to her instantaneous consumption utility t periods later.
We will say that a sequence ￿Uτ￿τ∈N of such utility functions admits a (stationary and





∗(t)Uτ+t (x) , (3)
for some f∗ : N+ → R. Here f∗ (t) is the weight that the decision maker places on her
welfare (total utility) t periods later.
A negative weight attached to another individual’s welfare expresses “spite” rather
than “altruism.” Such welfare weights appear pathological in the present context.4 We
will hence call a welfare-weight function f∗ regular if it is nonnegative. In this case we
will say that ￿Uτ￿τ∈N admits a regular welfare representation.
2.1 The functional equation
This study originated with the following question: Does the sequence ￿Uτ￿τ∈N deﬁned in
equation (1) admit a regular welfare representation? If so, which?5
A key result for answering this and related questions is the observation that every
sequence ￿Uτ￿τ∈N in the more general form (2) admits a welfare representation of the
form (3), and, moreover, f∗ : N+ → R is uniquely determined by the following system of
recursive equations:
4We do not deny that the excluded possibility may sometimes be psychologically relevant, but it
appears not to be typical for consumers.
5We were then ignorant of Zeckhauser and Fels (1968).
5f






Proposition 1: If ￿Uτ￿ satisﬁes equation (2) for some u : X → R and f :
N → R, then ￿Uτ￿ admits the welfare representation (3), where f∗ : N+ → R
is the unique solution to (4).
(See Appendix for a proof.)
Conversely, the consumption-weight function f may be obtained from the welfare-





f∗(t − s)f(s), (5)
a recursive equation system which uniquely determines f from f∗, given the initial value
f (0) = 1. This equation states that the consumption-utility weight f(t) can be computed
as the sum of that period’s instantaneous utility’s contributions to the decision maker’s
welfare in all interim periods: f (1) = f∗(1), f(2) = f∗( 2 )+[ f∗(1)]
2, f(3) = f∗(3) +
2f∗(2)f∗(1) +[f∗(1)]
3 etc.
It is immediate from equation (5) that if f∗ is non-negative, so is f. However, Propo-
sition 1 does not claim that the welfare representation necessarily be regular, even if f
is non-negative. Indeed, the welfare-weight function f∗ may well take negative values al-
though all consumption weights are positive. To see this, note that (4) gives f∗(1) = f (1),
f∗(2) = f (2) − f2(1), f∗ (3) = f (3) − 2f (1)f (2) + f3(1) etc. Hence, in order for the
welfare weight f∗(2) to be negative it suﬃces that f (2) <f 2(1). This is the case, for ex-
ample, if f (1) = δ and f (2) = βδ
2 for some β<1. Another example is f(t)=1 /(0.5+t)
for t =1 ,2 - since then f2(1) = (2.25)
−1 >f(2) = (2.5)
−1. A third counter-example
is f(t)=1 /(1 + t2), yielding f2(1) = 1/4 >f (2) = 1/5. In all three cases, the decision
maker is constantly spiteful to his future self two periods ahead.
A suﬃcient condition for all welfare weights to be non-negative, and hence for the
welfare representation to be regular, is that all consumption weights are positive and that
the ratio between successive consumption weights - the intertemporal substitution rate
between instantaneous utilities from consumption - be non-decreasing over time. This
result is due to Ulf Persson (private communication, see Appendix for a proof):
Proposition 2: Suppose f : N → R++ and let q : N+ → R be deﬁned by
q (t)=f (t)/f (t − 1).If q is non-decreasing, then f∗ ≥ 0. If q is strictly
increasing, then f∗ > 0.
6With f,f∗ ≥ 0, we clearly have 0 ≤ f∗(t) ≤ f (t) for all positive integers, by (4). If,
moreover, f (t) → 0 as t →∞ , then so does f∗(t).
In the following section we analyze examples of consumption-based and welfare-based
discount functions.
3E x a m p l e s
3.1 Exponential consumption weights
Suppose the consumption weights decline exponentially: f (t)=δ
t for all t,f o rs o m e
δ ∈ (0,1). This is the standard case in macroeconomic modelling, corresponding to the
special case β =1in equation (1). It is not diﬃcult to verify that equation (4) then gives
f∗(1) = δ and f∗ (t)=0for all integers t>1.
To see this, ﬁrst note that equation (4) gives f∗(1) = δ and f∗ (2) = 0. Suppose that









Hence, by induction this holds for all positive integers t. Note that this derivation also
applies to the boundary case δ =1 . Hence, “perfect altruism” in this sense (Ramsey, 1928)
is behaviorally equivalent with one-period welfare-based altruism, where next period’s
welfare is given weight 1 and the welfare in all future periods are given weight zero.
Conversely, suppose that the decision maker cares only about her utility from current
consumption and her welfare in the next period. Then f∗ (1) = α, for some α>0, and
f∗(t)=0for all integers t>1. An application of equation (5) immediately gives f(t)=αt






where the discount factor equals the weight that the decision maker attaches to his or her
welfare in the next period.
In sum: exponential consumption weights have a regular welfare foundation. Zero
weight is given to the welfare in all future periods except the next.
3.2 Exponential welfare weights
Suppose instead that it is the welfare weights f∗(t) that decrease exponentially over future
periods t. What are then the associated consumption weights? More exactly, suppose that
7f∗(t)=αt for some α ∈ (0,1) and for all t ∈ N+. Equation (5) gives f(1) = α, f (2) = 2α2,






This conjecture is easily proved to be true induction, see appendix. Substituting (7) in








for δ =2 α. Hence, exponential welfare weights assigned to all future periods imply the
Phelps-Pollak-Laibson reduced form (1) with β =1 /2.
Note that in the special case when α =1 /2, δ =1and thus f(t)=1 /2 for all positive
integers t. Hence, in this case the same weight is given to the instantaneous consumption
utility in all time periods. This special case is relevant from a biological viewpoint, since
the genetic kinship between any pair of successive generations is precisely 1/2.
3.3 Quasi-exponential consumption-utility weights
We found that exponential welfare weights imply quasi-exponential consumption weights
(β,δ) with β =1 /2. What welfare weights correspond to quasi-exponential consumption
weights (β,δ) when β ￿=1 /2?
Suppose, thus, that f (0) = 1 and f (t)=βδ
t for all positive integers, where β,δ ∈
(0,1). Then f∗ (1) = βδ and f∗ (2) = β (1 − β)δ






t ∀t ∈ N+ (9)
(see appendix). In other words: a representation in the Phelps-Pollak-Laibson form (1) is







t Uτ+t (x) ,( 1 0 )
where
β
∗ = β/(1 − β) and δ
∗ =( 1− β)δ. (11)
Quasi-exponential consumption weights thus do have a regular welfare foundation,
namely quasi-exponential welfare weights, and vice versa, and these weights are related
as in equation (11). As mentioned above, this result was obtained in Zeckhauser and Fels
(1968, eq. (4)). We note that the “welfare myopia” factor β
∗ is an increasing function of
8the “consumption myopia” factor β, such that β
∗ reaches the value 1 - hence exponential
welfare weights - precisely when β reaches 1/2, an observation that is consistent with our
earlier ﬁnding in the case of exponential welfare weights. At β =1 /2, welfare weights
switch from being biased toward “myopia” to being biased toward “longsightedness.”
Laibson et al (2001) made the following estimate of the parameter pair (β,δ) in the
Phelps-Pollak-Laibson model, based on annual US data: β =0 .55 and δ =0 .96.T h e
associated welfare representation is thus slightly biased toward “longsightedness”: β
∗ =
1.22 and δ
∗ =0 .43. In other words, individuals place relatively more weight on their future
welfare, in comparison with exponential weights: f∗(1) = β
∗δ




0.23 etc., see Figure 1 below.

















Figure 1: (a) Altruistic weights, f∗(t), corresponding to quasi-exponential consumption
weights (β,δ), for β =0 .55 and δ =0 .96. (b) The ratio f∗(t +1 ) /f∗(t) for the same
parameters.
3.4 Finite-horizon exponential welfare weights
We next consider the intermediate cases between one-period altruism and inﬁnite-horizon
exponential altruism, namely when the welfare weight decreases exponentially over a ﬁnite
number of time periods, beyond which all weights are zero. What is the corresponding
reduced form (2)? More exactly, suppose f∗(t)=αt for some α ∈ (0,1) and for all positive
integers t ≤ T<+∞, and suppose f∗(t)=0for all integers t>T. It is then easily veriﬁed
that f can be written as
f(t)=mT(t)α





mT(t − s) (13)
9for all positive integers t,a n dmT(0) = 1 (see appendix). It follows from (13) that, for any
ﬁnite horizon T,
1 ≤ mT(t) ≤ mT+1(t) ≤ 2t−1 (14)
and
α





for all t. Hence, the longer the altruism horizon T is, the higher is the weight given
to each future instantaneous utility term. Moreover, it follows from a well-known result
for recursive equations that the ratio between the m-weights assigned to two consecutive





= λT ,( 1 6 )
where λT is the unique solution λ>1 of λ =2− λ
−T. Notice that λT is increasing in T
and limT→∞ λT =2 .
In particular the sequence m2 (t) is the Fibonacci sequence, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 etc. (each
term being the sum of the two preceding terms). The ratio between successive Fibonacci









Note also that the induced weight function f, need not be monotonic. In fact, for all
T ≥ 2 and α>1/2: f(1) <f (2) <f (0). Figure 2 illustrates this feature for T =2and
α =0 .55.6








Figure 2: Consumption weights, f(t), generated from two-period-horizon exponential al-
truism, with α =0 .55.
6The number f(0) = 1 has been inserted for the sake of mathematical completeness when solving the
recursive equation (5).
103.5 Hyperbolic consumption-utility weights
Empirical work suggests that the consumption weights f(t) be hyperbolic, rather than
exponential, in t. Hence, Ainslie (1992) suggests f(t)=( λ + αt)
−1 for some α,λ > 0 (op.
cit. eq. (3.7)). A similar hyperbolic expression, (1+αt)−β/α is suggested by Loewenstein
and Prelec (1992).
As noted above, for certain α and λ, the ﬁrst form may correspond to negative welfare
weights - in which case the representation does not have a regular welfare representation.
In particular, such hyperbolic preferences express spite against oneself two periods ahead
(after each current period) if and only if λ+2α>(λ + α)
2. In Figure 3 below, this is the
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Figure 3: Points below the curve are parameter combinations (α,λ) for which the welfare
weight f∗(2) is negative.
We also note that this implies that the conditions in proposition 2 are violated if
λ+2α>(λ + α)
2. In fact, under the reversed inequality, and the assumption that f (0) =
1, all welfare weights are non-negative. To see this, let f (0) = 1 and f (t)=( λ + αt)
−1
for all positive t.T h e nq (t) ≥ q(t − 1) for all t ≥ 1 if and only if q(2) ≥ q(1), which is
equivalent to λ +2 α ≤ (λ + α)
2.
Without any loss of generality, we relabel the parameters in the second, and study
f(t)=( 1+at)−b ∀t ∈ N,( 1 7 )
for a,b > 0. It follows from proposition 2 that the corresponding welfare-weight function
f∗ is everywhere positive, since f>0 and the ratio between successive consumption-utility
weights is strictly increasing over time:
q(t)=
f (t)








7Recall that f∗ (2) = f (2) −f2 (1).A l s on o t et h a tf∗ (1) = f (1) ≤ 1 iﬀ λ+ α ≥ 1.
11We do not have an explicit formula for f∗, though. Instead, using equation (4) we have
generated the welfare weights f∗(t),f o rt =1 ,2,...,50, corresponding to the consumption
weights f (t)=( 1+at)
−b, for diﬀerent combinations of a and b, and ﬁtted the function
˜ f (t)=
θ
(1 − α + αt)
β (18)
to the data. (Note that ˜ f (1) = θ.)
Figure 4 below shows the welfare weights f∗(t) (dots) obtained from equation (5), for
a =1 0 0and b =1 , the estimated function-values ˜ f (t), as well as the ratio ˜ f (t)/f∗(t).




















Figure 4: (a) Altruistic weights f∗(t) obtained from equation f (t) = (1 + 100t)
−1,
t=1,2,..50 (dots) and the estimated function ˜ f (t) (solid line). (b) The ratio ˜ f (t)/f∗(t),
for t=1,2,..50.
Table 1 reports the estimates α, β and θ, as well as the maximum absolute and relative
errors in the ﬁrst 50 periods. We note that, for ﬁxed a, α is decreasing and β increasing
in b. Moreover, α ≈ 1 and β ≈ b when a is large.
12Table 1: Estimates of f∗ based on computer simulations.
a b θ α β max
t≤50
￿ ￿ ￿ ˜ f (t)-f∗(t)
￿ ￿ ￿ max
t≤50
￿ ￿ ￿ ˜ f (t)/f∗(t)-1
￿ ￿ ￿
1 1 0.49999 3.02432 1.28221 0.00079 0.09922
1 2 0.24999 1.74474 1.61539 0.00047 0.44643
1 5 0.03125 0.78373 3.97018 0.00001 4.31526
10 1 0.09091 1.07430 1.14852 0.00003 0.01001
10 2 0.00826 0.95289 1.97737 9.9 · 10−7 0.02664
10 5 6.2 · 10−6 0.90933 4.99927 4.3 · 10−7 0.00149
100 1 0.00990 1.00327 1.01909 1.9 · 10−7 0.00008
100 2 0.00009 0.99069 1.99968 1.7 · 10−10 0.00041
100 5 9.5 · 10−11 0.99009 4.99999 1.1 · 10−22 2.9 · 10−8
4 Desiderata for stationary discount functions
Having examined circumstances under which utility functions Uτ in the consumption-based
form (2) have a regular welfare foundation in the form (3), we now turn to a discussion of
some more desiderata for consumption-based discount functions f.
Our ﬁrst desideratum is that the representation (2) should be invariant with respect
to periodization, in the sense that there should exist a continuous-time discount function
from which the discrete-time consumption discount factor in each period t can be derived
for any given period length ∆ > 0. The Phelps-Pollack-Laibson model (1), to be referred
to as the PPL model, is unclear in this respect, since it states that discounting kicks in from
period 1 on, without specifying for what lengths ∆ of the time period this should hold,
or, more generally, how the parameters β and δ should be adjusted if the time period is
changed. In exponential discounting models one usually assumes δ =e x p( −r∆) for some
real-time discount rate r, but what about β?
Secondly, empirical work suggests that the considered class of discount functions should
contain some form of hyperbolic discounting as a special case. As mentioned above,
hyperbolic discounting of instantaneous utilities of consumption has been shown to ﬁt the
data better than exponential consumption discounting. It therefore seems desirable that
the model contain such hyperbolic consumption discounting as a special case. Clearly the
quasi-exponential PPL model does not meet this second desideratum - it only approximates
hyperbolic discounting over the ﬁrst few periods.
Third, exponential discounting has traditionally been the main approach in economics,
and should therefore be a special case of the model. The PPL model clearly meets this
desideratum (just set β =1in equation (1)).
If a random variable T is exponentially distributed, then its conditional probability
13distribution, given T ≥ t, is identical to the original, for any t. It is precisely this time
homogeneity property that guarantees dynamic consistency. As a weaker requirement,
in the present context of discount functions, our fourth desideratum is that the class of
discount functions considered should be “closed under truncation” in the sense that the
normalized consumption discount factors, from any given future date on should belong to
the class. When currently contemplating a future decision point, in a dynamic decision
problem, it should not be necessary to step outside the model. The quasi-exponential
(β,δ) model evidently satisﬁes this desideratum: the decision maker’s models of his future
selves are exponential.
Finally, the model, given in the consumption form (2), should have a regular welfare
foundation. We saw above that the PPL model (1) satisﬁes this last desideratum.
Formally, we consider stationary preferences over inﬁnite consumption streams x rep-





where ϕ(t,∆) is the discount factor that the decision maker in period τ ∈ N assigns to his
or her instantaneous utility of consumption in period τ +t, if the length of each period is
∆ > 0.
Let F be any family of functions ϕ : N × R+ → [0,1] such that for all ∆ > 0, ϕ(0,∆) =
1 and ϕ(t,∆) is non-increasing in t. Our desiderata are:
Desideratum 1 (invariance w.r.t. periodization): There exists a function
f : R+ → [0,1] such that ϕ(t,∆) = f (t∆) for all t ∈ N and ∆ > 0.
Desideratum 2 (hyperbolic discounting allowed): Every function ϕ of the
form ϕ(t,∆) = (1 + αt∆)
−β for some α>0 and β>1,belongs to F.
Desideratum 3 (exponential discounting allowed): Every function ϕ of the
form ϕ(t,∆) = exp(−γt∆) for some γ>0,belongs to F.
Desideratum 4 (algebraic closure under truncation): If ϕ ∈ F,then also





Desideratum 5(regular welfare foundation): If ϕ ∈ F and f : N →[0,1] is
deﬁned by f (t)=ϕ(t,1) for all t,then the associated welfare weights f∗ (t)
are all non-negative.
145 Hyperbolic-exponential discount functions
One family F which meets all ﬁve desiderata are the functions ϕ of the form
ϕ(t,∆) = (1 + at∆)
−b exp(−ct∆) (20)
for some a,b,c > 0. This family F is three-dimensional, the minimal parametric dimen-
sionality for the PPL model to hold across diﬀerent time discretization. Hence, we have
not added any real degree of freedom above and beyond that of the PPL model.
It is not diﬃcult to see that all ﬁve desiderata indeed hold. Desideratum 1 is given by
construction. Also Desiderata 2 and 3 are self-evident; one obtains exponential discounting
by setting b =0 , and hyperbolic discounting by setting c =0 . That desideratum 4 holds
follows from
ϕτ (t,∆) = (1 + a￿t∆)
−b exp(−ct∆),
where a￿ = a/(1 + ∆τa) > 0. In other words, ϕτ ∈ F. Note that the parameters b and c
are unaﬀected by such truncation of the past, while the parameter a changes. Dynamic
inconsistency in time preferences arises from the single fact that this parameter decreases
with the number τ of past periods, for any ﬁxed period length ∆. Desideratum 5, ﬁnally,
also holds. To see this, note that we have
f (t)=( 1+at)
−b exp(−ct),
which implies that all welfare weights f∗(t) are positive, see proposition 2.
In order to compare this family of discount functions with the PPL model, we consider
the successive ratios between discount values. Recall that in the PPL model these rates
are q(1) = f (1)/f (0) = βδ and q (t)=f (t)/f (t − 1) = δ for all positive integers t, while
the corresponding ratios for discount functions f from the family F are
q(t)=
f (t)








where δ = e−c. In particular, q (1) = βδ, for β =( 1+a)
−b, and q (t) → δ as t →∞ ,j u s t
as in the PPL model. See Figure 5 below, plotted for the values β =0 .55 and δ =0 .96,
with a and b such that (1 + a)
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Figure 5: The ratios q(t), for a =1(solid curve) and 125 (dotted curve), where
b = −(lnβ)/ln(1 + a),a n dc = −lnδ,f o rβ =0 .55 and δ =0 .96.
As a ﬁnal remark, we note that the present family of discount functions seems to
be suﬃciently rich to ﬁt a wide range of empirical observations. Frederick, Loewenstein
and O’Donoghue (2001) report empirical estimates of discount rates from no less than 40
studies (Table 2, op. cit.) Their general ﬁnding is that the average discount rate over
longer time intervals is lower than the average discount rate over shorter time intervals.
Figure 6 below is their Figure 1, with the addition of the dotted curve. The points are
their data points, and the solid curve has been ﬁtted by them, while the dotted curve has
been ﬁtted by us, from a discount function in the present family F.8 This ﬁtting was made
by way of “eye econometrics,” resulting in the following estimates: a =1 0 , b =0 .3 and
c =0 .
Figure 6: Fitting a discount function f (dotted curve) from the family F to the data in
Figure 1 of Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2001).
8The dotted curve is the graph of y(t)=[ f (t)]
1/t =( 1+at)
−b/t e−c,f o ra =1 0 , b =0 .3 and c =0 .
Note that limt→0 y(t)=e x p[ −(ab +c)] and.limt→+∞ y(t)=e x p( −c).
16Figures 7 and 8 compare the consumption weights f(t) and the welfare weights f∗(t)
corresponding to our estimate, f(t)=( 1+1 0 t)−0.3 (gray bars), with the Laibson et al
(2001) estimate (black bars in ﬁgure 7) and with exponential discounting with an annual
discount rate of 5% (black bars in ﬁgure 8). The latter is the estimate of Cooley and
Prescott (1995).9
















Figure 7: (a) f(t)=( 1+1 0 t)−0.3 (black) and quasi-exponential consumption weights
(β,δ), for β =0 .55 and δ =0 .96 (gray).(b) The corresponding welfare weights f∗(t)
















Figure 8: (a) f(t)=( 1+1 0 t)−0.3 (black) and f(t)=e−0.05t (gray).(b) The corresponding
welfare weights f∗(t).
6E x t e n s i o n
The class of models studied here contains as special cases the traditional exponential
discounting as well as the quasi-exponential discounting models which are currently under
investigation in the macroeconomics literature (see e.g. Laibson (1997), Barro (1999),
Krusell and Smith (1999) and Harris and Laibson (2001)). However, from the viewpoint
9To be more precise, they give the estimate 0.987 of the quarterly discount factor.
17of psychology and experimental economics, all these models are quite special, as is apparent
from reading, for example, Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2001) and Kahneman
(2000). Given the accumulated knowledge of discounting models, it might be wise to
proceed step-wise when generalizing these, by adding only one new element at a time,
so as better understand what assumption leads to what conclusion. At each such step,
the task then is to change little and yet add a lot in terms of richer conclusions. The
mentioned recent work on quasi-exponential models can be viewed as a successful such
step.
We feel that a major aspect of intertemporal preferences and decision making which
is missing from current economics models is memory. At ﬁrst sight, one might argue that
although our memories certainly do aﬀect our well-being, this is irrelevant for decision
making, since the memory of the decision maker is ﬁxed and given. However, if the decision
maker is forward-looking, and cares about his or her future well-being, then memory is
relevant, since a decision today may inﬂuence future memories. Can the forward-looking
models considered here be generalized in an operational way so as to include memory?
We believe they can.
Consider a decision maker who is born in period 0 and lives through a sequence of
time periods. In each period τ, let his or her memory be a function of the “history”
hτ =( x0,x 1,...,xτ−1) preceding that period. Assume that the preferences ￿τ in each
decision period τ are represented by a utility function Uτ : X∞ → R of the following form:




for some v : X × H → R and f : N → R, where H = {h0}∪ t∈N+ Xt and h0 is the “null”
history at birth. Here v(xτ,h τ) may still be interpreted as the instantaneous utility in
period τ, arising from current consumption and, now, also from current memory. Formally,
also this generalized model falls into the category of models covered by the above analysis,
so one may speak of welfare foundations and other desiderata in precisely the manner done
above.
A key concern, however, is to ﬁnd an operational and behaviorally justiﬁable functional
form for v. In the light of Kahneman (2000) it seems desirable to allow v to account for
the “peak” and “end” eﬀects, that is, v should depend on the maximum value of pleasure
or pain in the history and on the most recent elements of that history. Roughly speaking,
the idea is that one’s best and worst meals play a prominent role in one’s memory. One
18formalization which captures this is:






+µ(1 − α − β)







where u : X → R+ as before represents the instantaneous utility from current consump-
tion, and where α,β,γ,µ,ν ∈ [0,1].H e r e µ represents the importance of memory in
comparison with current consumption, and α and β the relative importance for memory
of the maximal and minimal experienced consumption utility, respectively, and the last
term is the exponentially discounted mean value of past consumption utilities, where ν is
the emphasis on the most recent past (only the most recent period matters when ν =1 ).
We leave these investigations for future research.
7A p p e n d i x
7.1 Proof of proposition 1
Suppose ￿Uτ￿ satisﬁes equation (2) for some u : X → R and f : N → R with f (0) = 1.





































Since this holds for all τ, this proves the claim.
197.2 Proof of proposition 210
Suppose ﬁrst that q is non-decreasing. We know that f∗ (1) = f (1) > 0. Suppose
f∗(s) ≥ 0 ∀s<t . Then




= q(t)f(t − 1) − f(1)f




∗(s)f(t − s − 1)
≥ q(t)
￿









∗(t − 1) − f(1)f
∗(t − 1) = [q(t) − f(1)]f
∗(t − 1) ≥ 0.
The last inequality follows from the assumption that q is non decreasing and f(1) = q(1).
Secondly, suppose that q is strictly increasing. Suppose f∗(s) > 0 ∀s<t .T h es a m e
reasoning as above then leads to f∗(t) > [q(t) − q(1)]f∗(t − 1) > 0 .
7.3 Proof of equation (7)
Suppose f(s)=2 s−1αs for s =1 ,2,..,t, for some positive integer t. Then (5) gives


















1+( 2 t − 1)
￿
=2 tαt+1.( 2 2 )
By induction in t, this establishes (7).
7.4 Proof of equation (9)
Equation (9) may be established by induction over t, as follows. First note that f(1) =
f∗(1). Suppose that equation (9) holds for all s<tfor some t. Equation (5) then gives




































1 − (1 − β)t−1￿
= βδ
t
7.5 Proof of equation (13)
















Setting f∗(s)=αs for all positive integers s ≤ T and otherwise f∗(s)=0 , we obtain (5).
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